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State Dept. review completed

Prince Sihanouk to Yugoslavia

The headline, "Friend from Cambodia," in the Yugoslav press trumpets the arrival of Prince Sihanouk in Belgrade today. Sihanouk's official visit--his first to Yugoslavia since he was forced into exile in March 1970--will last five days. He is expected to meet with President Tito and other top Yugoslav officials. Yugoslavia, which closed its Embassy in Phnom Penh shortly after the coup, has been among the most ardent supporters in the Prince's Royal Government of National Unity. Belgrade's loyality to Sihanouk stems from his past commitment to nonalignment.

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Budapest Taking Firm Hand With Youth

A recent issue of the party daily Nepszabadsag, reported that eight young persons had been tried and convicted for participating in public expressions of Fungarian nationalism in mid-March. Handing down sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year and 10 months, the court suspended three of the terms, undoubtedly to demonstrate its lenient and thoughtful consideration of the cases. Nonetheless, this previously unannounced legal action shows the regime's determination to adopt a firmer hand with its more rambunctious young people. Openly anti-Soviet demonstrations in the spring of 1971 apparently elicited only a mild response from the authorities; the miscreants were detained a short while and then sent home after a sound scolding.

Faced this spring with Soviet criticism of the looser edges of the Hungarian domestic scene, Budapest apparently has felt obliged to adopt a sterner public posture. Members of the party leadership have underscored this attitude. Speaking to a gathering of educational functionaries recently, Kadar described education as "our weakest point" at the moment, 25X1 called for more discipline in the schoolroom ("school is not a sports club"), and reminded his audience that education must instill "duties as well as rights." At the same time, however, and in typical Kadar fashion

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the Hungarian leader tried to appear reasonable. Youth should be judged, he decreed, not by their long hair and jeans but by their fulfillment of obligations.

Cultural affairs chief, Gyorgy Aczel, writing in a Soviet youth paper, understandably presented a harder line. Describing youth as the "most susceptible" section of Hungarian society, Aczel claimed Budapest was waging an "implacable struggle" against bourgeois ideology. How far the regime is willing to go to implement these tougher words remains to be seen. Certainly any public embarrassments—such as the March distrubance—will incur a swift reaction from the regime in the near future. We, however, would not look for any significant changes in the party's relatively flexible youth policy.

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Poles Conduct Activist Foreign Policy

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The regime is making a concerted effort to promote its diplomatic image following the prestigious visit of President Nixon in early June. Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, appointed last March to head up Gierek's diplomatic "offensive," has had a strenuous schedule presenting Poland's views on international affairs to Warsaw's socialist allies and to the Western powers. In recent weeks he not only has publicly expounded Polish views on the progress on European detente, and Warsaw's role in it, but he has traveled to Austria, Norway, Romania and Bulgaria in pursuit of Poland's bilateral and multilateral goals. His plans also call for a heavy schedule this fall—he is expected to travel to Bonn, Paris (with First Secretary Gierek), Stockholm, and to the UN General Assembly.

Warsaw has been equally energetic in fostering its diplomatic status by hosting visits by several leading foreign dignitaries. Tito's visit in June, for instance, was the high water mark in post-war relations between the two countries and established Poland as a leading advocate of productive bloc relations with the one-time socialist pariah. The 5-8 July visit of UN Secretary General Waldheim underlined Warsaw's interest in assuming a stronger role in the UN and other international organizations. Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Trepczynski, for example, is a leading candidate for the presidency of this year's UN General Assembly. In addition, the Poles have just hosted President

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Nixon's personal scientific adviser, Dr. Edward E. David in an effort to further US-Polish scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation.

The reason behind this multi-pronged diplomatic campaign may have best been described by Olszowski in a recent conversation with US Ambassador Stoessel. Olszowki stated that President Nixon's visit had underlined Warsaw's "independence" in the international arena and had demonstrated that Poland was the biggest and most important country in the socialist camp after the Soviet Union and had a role "of its own" to play in Europe. Olszowski added that some people in Poland and in other socialist countries had looked askance at the Nixon visit because of the Vietnam war and for ideological reasons. This was important, Olszowski stated, but it was not central to the "national interest" of Poland.

Although Olszowski may have been flushed with Poland's recent successes in the foreign field, his remarks clearly reflect Warsaw's official thinking. Polish diplomats abroad have buttonholed their US counterparts to reiterate the same message. The Polish ambassador in Tokyo, for instance, earlier had remarked to the US ambassador that Warsaw had circulated to all Polish embassies its policy line on the Nixon visit. This line praised the President's "pragmatic" approach to European affairs and referred to Nixon's realization that Poland exercised considerable influence visavis the USSR. Similarly, the Polish charge at the UN sought out Ambassador Bennett of the US staff and emphasized that Warsaw wished to follow a "cooperative and independent" policy with respect to Europe.

Warsaw's effort to stake out a stronger position in both bloc and East-West affairs undoubtedly reflects Moscow's growing confidence that the Gierek regime is a valuable ally in pursuit of Soviet interests. For all of the talk of "independence," however, the Poles realize that their initiatives must be both carefully tailored as well as consistent with overall bloc interests. Polish leaders have been quick to voice their allegiance to the Soviet Union

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and socialist camp.

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